The Equity Analytics of the NFL
Equity Analytics7 sections · about 15 minutes

Two decades of the same conversation.

Every January the NFL coaching carousel surfaces the same question: why aren't there more Head Coaches of Color? The debate repeats because it keeps focusing on one number. That number cannot show where in the pipeline the gap is produced.

The bottleneck sits one step below the top — and closing it has to start at the bottom.

The Leadership Opportunity Gap in the NFL Coaching Pipeline
Share of NFL players, assistant coaches, and head coaches who are People of Color.
Sources. Players: TIDES NFL Racial & Gender Report Cards, Table 1 (Players of Color = 100 − % White − % not disclosed); no figure published for 2000–02, 2004, 2015, 2017–18, and none since 2023. Coaches: Rider, Wade, Swaminathan & Schwab combined with TIDES, 1985–2024. Head-coach values for 2025 and 2026 are provisional and shown dashed.
Why now1 of 7

The stakes are no longer only rhetorical.

The question has run on sports radio for more than twenty years. The names change; the debate doesn't. Some commentators cite the Rooney Rule's symbolic value, others its stagnant outcomes. It is, on the face of it, the same conversation as in 2003.

Of ten head-coach vacancies filled in January 2026, one went to a Coach of Color. The league entered the 2026 season with three Black Head Coaches — the same number as in 2003, when the firings of Tony Dungy and Dennis Green prompted Cyrus Mehri and Johnnie Cochran Jr. to push the Rooney Rule into existence.

Tony Dungy at the Pro Football Hall of Fame
Tony Dungy. His firing by Tampa Bay, alongside Dennis Green's by Minnesota, preceded the rule's adoption.
Photo: Erik Drost, 2021. CC BY 2.0.
Johnnie Cochran Jr. in 2001
Johnnie Cochran Jr. With Cyrus Mehri, he threatened litigation over the statistical evidence and pushed the rule into existence. Photographed in 2001.
Photo: Mark Winograd. Public domain.
2023 — 2026

Three years that raised the evidentiary bar.

June 2023
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard strikes down race-conscious admissions. Whether a policy governs opportunity or outcome becomes the operative test for every Rooney Rule analog in corporate America.
August 2025
In Flores v. NFL, the Second Circuit rules the league's arbitration clause has "insurmountable flaws" and constitutes "arbitration in name only." Brian Flores's discrimination claims proceed in open court.
March 2026
Florida's Attorney General demands the NFL stop enforcing the Rooney Rule inside the state, calling it "blatant race and sex discrimination." Three NFL teams play in Florida.
May 2026
The Supreme Court declines to review Flores v. NFL, leaving the Second Circuit ruling intact. The claims will be tried on evidence about how specific hiring and promotion decisions were made — the same decisions an equity-analytic decomposition isolates.
Roger Goodell speaking at a podium
Roger Goodell, NFL Commissioner.
Photo: SSG Teddy Wade, U.S. Army, 2012. Public domain.
"We have to continue to evaluate everything we're doing and every aspect of the hiring process — how do we professionalize it to the best of our ability." Roger Goodell, NFL Commissioner · ESPN, February 3, 2026

The debate is live. But the debate circles, because its participants treat representation at the top as the only number that matters. That number establishes that something is wrong. It leaves open where in the pipeline the gap is produced, and what would close it.

The framework2 of 7

Two promotion mechanisms. Two ways each goes wrong.

People rise through organizations via two promotion mechanisms, and each can fail in two ways. Cross them and you get four distinct causes of the same gap — each requiring a different intervention. The framework is Rider & Reagans; we set it out in Achieving Diversity Through Equity Analytics (AACSB Insights, 2022).

The mechanisms
AllocationsWhich positions people occupy — at hire, and throughout a career.
ValuationsHow actual or potential contributions are judged — of candidates before they hold a position, and of employees once they do.
The failure modes
Differential treatmentEquivalent people, different standards. ≠ behaviors → ≠ outcomes.
Disparate impactA neutral rule applied to an unevenly distributed pool. = behaviors → ≠ outcomes.

Reading the arrows. Left to right along the top: sorting into playing position carries forward into the coaching position a new coach is assigned. Right to left along the bottom: disparate valuations amplify differential ones. Top to bottom in each column: the allocation cell precedes the valuation cell in a career.

One career path, four rungs
  1. A youth football running back carrying the ball through contact.
    01 · YOUTH

    A seven-year-old is assigned to running back, not quarterback — partly on the basis of ascribed identity.

    High school football, 2003. Photo: SSgt Tony R. Tolley, U.S. Air Force. Public domain.
  2. A college running back carrying the ball upfield.
    02 · COLLEGE

    That playing assignment shapes his college position.

    College running back, Hawaii Bowl, 2007. Photo: Mark Ramelb, CC BY-SA 3.0. Cropped under the same licence.
  3. Tony Dews, running backs coach, on the field before a game.
    03 · FIRST JOB

    His college position shapes his first coaching job.

    Tony Dews, running backs coach, Tennessee, 2019. Photo: Chipermc, CC BY-SA 4.0. Cropped under the same licence.
  4. Anthony Lynn, portrait.
    04 · COORDINATOR

    His first coaching job shapes his odds of promotion to coordinator.

    Anthony Lynn ran these rungs in order: running backs coach, then offensive coordinator at Buffalo and Detroit, then head coach at the Chargers. Photo: Ben Liebenberg, CC BY-SA 3.0.

The cells are not independent.

Ascribed identity enters early and is carried forward by cells that are neutral on their face. The photographs illustrate the rungs, not the people: no claim is made about any individual shown.

The two valuation cells also compound. A neutral preference for offensive experience raises the career return on positions that one group already occupies more often, so equally capable candidates accumulate unequal records of the credentials evaluators treat as evidence of readiness. Those thinner records then supply the ambiguity in which differential standards operate: where a candidate's dossier is sparser, evaluators lean more heavily on impressions formed from ascribed identity. In each cycle evaluators apply the standard to a record that earlier cycles already shaped, so a disparate valuation at one stage widens the room for differential valuation at the next.

Because valuations cover potential as well as realized contributions, they operate on both sides of the hiring line — on candidates being assessed for a job and on employees being assessed within one. That distinction is what determines how far the Rooney Rule can reach.

Where the Rooney Rule sits

In the allocations row, and entirely pre-employment. It allocates interview opportunities: who enters the candidate pool, not who is selected from it.

Why that design is defensible

Law professor N. Jeremi Duru argues it mandates opportunity, not outcome, and is non-zero-sum — teams may interview as many candidates as they like.

And why that same design limits it

The objective is representation among the employed, but the rule reaches only the candidate pool. It is also why the rule, on its own, shouldn't be expected to close the head coach representation gap.

The book on this rule

Advancing the Ball

Race, Reformation, and the Quest for Equal Coaching Opportunity in the NFL

N. Jeremi Duru, Professor of Law at American University, with a foreword by Tony Dungy. Duru traces the Rooney Rule from the litigation threat that produced it through its expansion, and he is the scholar who has argued most directly that its process-based design is what will let it survive post-SFFA challenge.

He is also one of the people we took the coordinator finding to in 2016.

Oxford University Press, 2011 · 204 pp · ISBN 978-0-19-973600-3 · American University listing · His 2025 post-SFFA article · Buy on Amazon
Author photo courtesy of N. Jeremi Duru.
The test case3 of 7

Why the NFL is an unusually good laboratory.

Consider what the setting supplies. Dozens of standardized, objectively measured performance metrics, recorded at the team, unit, and position levels — for people who spend their careers moving among a bounded set of employers, on a hierarchy with the same three rungs everywhere: position coach, coordinator, head coach. Careers are observed publicly, in detail, over long horizons.

Few other settings offer any one of those properties. Almost none offer all of them at once. That combination is what makes it possible to hold constant what people actually do and still have variation left to examine.

With Jim Wade, Anand Swaminathan, and Andreas Schwab, we assembled career histories for 1,317 NFL coaches from 1985 through 2015 — roughly 10,000 coach-years of hand-coded data drawn from official NFL media guides.

1,317
NFL coaches
~10,000
coach-years
1985–2015
observation window
~400
Coaches of Color — 31% of coaches, 27.3% of coach-years

Identity was coded by multiple raters from photographs and biographies, using U.S. Census categories. What matters for this analysis is not how coaches identify themselves but how they are perceived by the people making promotion decisions. The outcome we explain is a decision others make, so the relevant construct is ascribed identity.

We control for age, NFL and NCAA experience, playing and coaching positions, team tenure, college degree, winning percentage, 50-plus unit-level performance metrics, leadership and ownership changes, prior success, network ties, and the head coach's ascribed identity — with franchise, position, and year fixed effects throughout.

That depth makes apples-to-apples comparisons tractable: hold constant what coaches do, then ask whether equally situated White coaches and Coaches of Color advance at equal rates. What follows does exactly that, one step at a time up the ladder.

The first obstacle4 of 7

Allocation into different starting positions.

Coaching careers in the NFL begin with sorting. New coaches are typically assigned to coach the position they themselves played — and playing positions are, and long have been, racially stratified.

Where careers start, and where starting positions lead All coaches, pooled
Each dot is one coaching position. Horizontal axis: share of initial coach-years. Label inside each dot: probability of ever reaching head coach from that position.
DC defensive coordinator · OC offensive coordinator · QB quarterbacks · DBSEC defensive backs and secondary · WR wide receivers · TE tight ends · OL offensive line · RB running backs · LB linebackers · DL defensive line · ST special teams · QC quality control

Careers begin where playing careers ended

In our sample, 63.7% of Coaches of Color first coached the position they played in college, against 45.5% of White coaches. That stratification flows forward into initial coaching assignments.

63.7% vs. 45.5%

Starting positions are not interchangeable

Defensive coordinator, offensive coordinator, and quarterbacks coach have historically produced head coaches at meaningful rates. Others have not. Coaches of Color disproportionately played running back, defensive back, and wide receiver; White coaches disproportionately played quarterback and offensive line.

Consider Jim Harbaugh's path

Played quarterback, coached quarterbacks, offensive coordinator, then head coach at Stanford, the 49ers, Michigan, the Chargers. A recognizable path.

Not a claim about Harbaugh, who is a great coach. A claim about the route: statistically, it is the one best positioned to produce a head coach. Coaches starting in running-backs or defensive-backs rooms rarely travel a comparable one.

The pattern persists beyond the first job

Coaches of Color hold lower-yield positions throughout their careers — what researchers call stacking.

Multiplying each position's probability of producing a head coach by the share of coach-years each group spends there quantifies the allocative disadvantage.

4.2×
White-coach advantage based on initial position — 0.168 vs. 0.040
3.05×
White-coach advantage based on current position — 0.018 vs. 0.006

That is the allocative component of the gap, already substantial before we examine what happens inside each position.

The second obstacle5 of 7

Differential valuation within the same position.

Allocations do not account for the full disparity. Holding constant position, experience, network ties, and objective performance, White coaches are 58–74% more likely to be promoted than comparably situated Coaches of Color, depending on the specification. The gap persisted after 2003, because the Rooney Rule targeted head-coach hiring — not the promotions that feed the head-coach pool.

White-coach promotion advantage across model specifications
Hazard multipliers; parity = 1.0. The top band estimates promotion from any position to a higher one under progressively more demanding controls; the middle band splits those promotions by whether they came from another employer or the same one. The bottom band estimates two specific steps instead. These estimates come from population data on roughly 10,000 coach-years rather than a random sample, so we report effect sizes rather than significance tests. The two step-specific estimates rest on far fewer transitions and are correspondingly imprecise.

One result that rarely enters the public debate: conditioning on current position, the estimated gap at the head-coach step falls to 1.36×. Few coaches make that transition, so the estimate is imprecise — it neither establishes parity at that step nor rules out a gap larger than 1.36×.

But most coaches do not reach coordinator.

The bottleneck is one step below the top
Where head-coach promotions come from, and where the promotion gap is largest.

The coordinator ranks are where the pipeline narrows. A coach who reaches them competes on level terms for the top job; a coach who does not is largely out of contention, whatever else is true of him.

Byron Leftwich on the sideline as Tampa Bay offensive coordinator
Byron Leftwich, offensive coordinator, Tampa Bay, 2021.
Photo: All-Pro Reels. CC BY-SA 2.0. Cropped; the crop is offered under the same licence.
88%
White-coach advantage in promotions to coordinator
79%
Share of head-coach promotions that come from the coordinator ranks
1.36×
To head coach, given current position — imprecisely estimated

The bottleneck is not at the top. It is one step below — where the Rooney Rule did not apply when it was adopted.

How the rule has changed since 2003 5 revisions

The Rooney Rule has widened repeatedly since adoption, in both the roles it covers and the candidates who satisfy it.

Adoption, 2003
Teams with a head-coaching vacancy must interview at least one Candidate of Color for the head coach position.
Front office
Extended beyond head coach to general manager and senior football operations roles, requiring teams to interview at least one — and under later amendments at least two — external minority candidates.
Coaching staff
Extended to coordinator positions (offensive, defensive, special teams) and subsequently to quarterbacks coach, with a requirement to interview at least one diverse candidate.
Strengthened, 2020–21
Two external minority candidates required for head-coaching vacancies, and two for general manager or equivalent senior football executive and coordinator roles, with at least one interview conducted in person for head-coach and GM searches.
Broadened, 2022
The definition of a diverse candidate was expanded to include women. Clubs interview at least two diverse candidates for head coach, general manager, and coordinator roles; at least one for quarterbacks coach; and at least one minority and/or female candidate for senior executive positions such as club president. Every team must also employ a league-funded offensive assistant who is a woman and/or a member of an ethnic or racial minority.

Sources: Rooney Rule · ESPN · Yahoo Sports · ABC News

Every Black Head Coach in the modern era
Each bar is one tenure. Interim appointments in grey. The series behind the trend line, named.
Fritz Pollard in football uniform, throwing pose, 1916
Fritz Pollard in uniform at Brown, 1916. He played for the Akron Pros from 1920 and in 1921 became their co-head coach while still playing — the NFL's first Black Head Coach. The next would not arrive for 68 years.
Photo: unknown photographer, published 1916. Public domain.

The table below begins in 1989, with Art Shell. It is the modern era as TIDES defines it — and the gap between Pollard and Shell is why the modern era carries a separate name.

Source. TIDES 2021 NFL Racial and Gender Report Card, Table 3, "Historical Listing of African-American Professional Head Coaches in the NFL." The table covers the modern era; Fritz Pollard coached Akron in 1921. Tenures are shown as listed and end at the 2021 report, so Mike Tomlin and Brian Flores are truncated there rather than at their actual end dates. Hires after 2021 — including Mike McDaniel, DeMeco Ryans, Antonio Pierce, Jerod Mayo and Aaron Glenn — are not in this table.

Related. As of February 2025, the Associated Press reported that 11 of 32 franchises had never had a Black Head Coach.
Interventions6 of 7

Where interventions actually work.

With the mechanisms decomposed, the intervention question becomes tractable. We simulated each mechanism in isolation, holding the other fixed.

White-coach advantage in promotion to head coach
Parity = 1.0. Compare interventions applied at a coach's first job versus at their current job.

Observed

White coaches hold a 4.19× advantage measured at initial position, and 3.05× measured at current position. This is the disparity as it stands.

4.19× initial · 3.05× current

Allocative intervention only

Assign positions equivalently by race; preserve actual, race-specific promotion probabilities. At initial position the gap narrows but does not close — a 2.5× edge survives, because within-position promotion differences keep accumulating up the ladder. At current position it falls from 3.05× to 1.33×.

4.19× → 2.51× at initial position

Valuative intervention only

Preserve the actual, unequal allocations; equalize position-specific promotion probabilities by race. At initial position the gap collapses to 0.90× — essentially parity. At current position it falls from 3.05× to 1.85×.

4.19× → 0.90× at initial position

The takeaway

The closer to the start of the career we can equalize within-position promotion probabilities, the larger the effect on representation at the top.

Only the valuative intervention at initial position reaches parity

The central implication of the simulation

If we want to achieve parity at the top, then we must start at the bottom. Interventions that apply at the earliest career stages reach the most subsequent decisions about that career.

A three-part answer to the debate that recurs every January.

To what degree, and under what conditions, does the Rooney Rule help?
Asked as works-or-doesn't, the question outruns the data. Ten or so vacancies a year across 32 teams, and no performance target set when the rule was adopted. Numerous published papers offer different conclusions because whether one looks at the representation time trend and sees a looming cliff, plateau, or incline depends on what one assumes would have happened if there was no Rooney Rule (i.e., the counterfactual). And there is no definitive estimate of that scenario. Degree and conditions are the answerable version of the question, and the next two answers are where the conditions sit.
Is it applied where the bottleneck lives?
No. The coordinator-promotion step is where the gap is largest and the data are clearest. The 2016 extension helped, but the rule remains an allocative, process-based tool applied where the bottleneck is valuative.
What's next for the Rooney Rule?
For the NFL: revise, not abandon. The process-based design that makes the rule legally durable post-SFFA is what prevents it from closing a valuative gap. Closing that gap requires changes in how candidates are evaluated, and at earlier stages in their careers. For other organizations: implementing a Rooney Rule as an A/B test or randomized controlled trial would produce valuable evidence of the rule's effectiveness.
Listen — the standing offer
"I just need one organization that hires many people. One leader who wants to run an A-B test, a randomized, controlled trial where some jobs are subject to the Rooney Rule and other jobs are not."

Freakonomics Radio, Episode 604 — "Did the N.F.L. Solve Diversity Hiring? (Part 2)," September 25, 2024. With N. Jeremi Duru, Jim Rooney, Herm Edwards, Tynesia Boyea-Robinson, and Scott Shephard.

What the trial would look like

A compositional directive, run as an A/B test.

The Rooney Rule is one instance of a general class: a compositional directive, which requires that a search interview at least one candidate from an under-represented group before an offer is made. The class has spread widely without direct evidence on whether it works. Here is a design that would produce some.

All open searches in a hiring cycle every requisition, not a hand-picked subset Randomize by search Each opening draws a condition. Not each candidate, not each department. CONDITION A · CONTROL No directive The recruiter may extend an offer whenever the hiring manager agrees. Business as usual. CONDITION B · TREATMENT Directive applies No offer may be made until at least n candidates from the group are interviewed, where n ≥ 1. CONDITIONS C–Z · OPTIONAL Variants of the directive Raise n to 2. Or vary which group the directive names. Each variant answers a different question. TRACK EVERY APPLICANT THROUGH FOUR STAGES Interviewed did the pool change? Offered did selection change? Accepted did candidates say yes? Hired did representation change? Separating the stages is what distinguishes a directive that widens the pool from one that changes who is chosen. THE PART MOST DESIGNS LEAVE OUT Collect a baseline first — 50 to 100 prior searches. Comparing A against B says only which condition did better. It cannot say whether the directive beat the status quo. If B reaches 25% and A reaches 18%, that reads as a success against a baseline of 18% and as a decline against a baseline of 30% — the same two numbers, opposite conclusions. Analysis: balance tests on the randomization, then difference-in-means at each stage, then regression to check that the inference survives controls. Interviews with recruiters and hiring managers afterward, to interpret what the numbers show.
Design outline for an A/B test of a compositional directive. Randomization is at the level of the open search, so recruiters apply one rule per requisition rather than choosing case by case.
What an organization would need to supply.
  • Volume. Enough searches to power the comparison. How many depends on the baseline rate, which is why the baseline stage comes first.
  • Anonymized records for every applicant in every focal search — qualifications, position characteristics, and the four outcome flags. No names required.
  • Willingness to randomize. The condition has to be assigned before the search opens, and held to.

Roughly a year end to end: one to two months to establish the baseline, then six to twelve months of live searches, depending on hiring rate. I will do the analysis pro bono.

06b — What replaces good intentions

Five design principles for equitable pipelines.

With Stefan Szymanski, I compared the NFL's Rooney Rule against English football's Football Leadership Diversity Code — one compulsory, one voluntary — and extracted the design choices that determine whether a policy changes anything.

Principle 01
Participation
Mandatory, not voluntary. Nearly half of eligible English clubs simply opted out of the FA's Code, which capped its reach before it started.
Principle 02
Objectives
Auditable process and outcome targets. The Rooney Rule mandated process without targets; the FA Code set targets without process. Each addresses half the problem.
Principle 03
Compliance
Rewards paired with credible sanctions. The FA Code carried no consequence for missing a target, no public ranking, and no penalty for declining to participate.
Principle 04
Scope
The whole pipeline, not the final step. Entry-point bottlenecks are allocation problems; mid-career bottlenecks are valuation problems. Each needs its own intervention.
Principle 05
Advocacy
Independent external scrutiny. The Rooney Rule exists because of the Fritz Pollard Alliance; the FA's shift to mandatory reporting followed the Black Footballers Partnership's independent analysis.

The English evidence is stark. Across the FA Code's 2022/23 reporting year, 73.2% of clubs that hired any senior coaches hired zero Black, Asian or mixed-heritage senior coaches — no club falling in between. Only 27.3% met the senior leadership target. The FA's own chief executive called the results disappointing:

"We are disappointed that the results this year show that the game is making slower progress than hoped in diversifying its leadership, coaching staff and workforce." Mark Bullingham, CEO, The Football Association · Football Leadership Diversity Code, Year Three Report, November 2023

That admission is itself an instance of Principle 05. The FA had characterized the voluntary Code as exceeding expectations. What changed the account was an independent statistical analysis published by the Black Footballers Partnership, which showed the Code was failing and that some clubs were regressing in diverse hiring.

Independent scrutiny — the Black Footballers Partnership
"The numbers tell their own sad story at a time of celebrating 75 years of the Windrush generation."

Delroy Corinaldi, co-founder, Black Footballers Partnership · Sky Sports, June 2023

43%of Premier League players are Black
4.4%hold management positions
1.6%hold executive, leadership, or ownership roles

What the BFP has asked for. During debate over the Football Governance Bill, Corinaldi argued the bill was "too narrow" and called on government to "get serious" and "address the bias" in Black manager representation — that is, to bring leadership representation inside the regulator's remit rather than leave it to voluntary codes. The BFP has also said it looks to hold "constructive and strategic conversations with the FA to deliver a future in football that is truly merit-based and fair for all."

England's constriction also sits further upstream than the NFL's. Only about 14% of UEFA Pro Licence holders in England are Black — a credentialing gate above the FA's own authority, which limits the pool before any vacancy arises. The UK's Football Governance Act 2025 and its Independent Football Regulator make equality reporting a licensing condition, which is the first structural test of whether these principles work under statutory authority rather than voluntary commitment.

The same shape in two countries
Share of each rank who are People of Color. English figures are Black individuals; NFL figures are Individuals of Color.
English football data from Szymanski (2023), English professional football: A statistical analysis, Black Footballers Partnership. NFL data from the 2023 Racial and Gender Report Card, TIDES. Adapted from Rider & Szymanski (2026), Figure 5.
Beyond sports7 of 7

Why this framework applies broadly.

Our first study of racial disparity, with Adina Sterling and David Tan, was of attorneys who worked for law firms that dissolved during the 2008–09 financial crisis, when clients like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Washington Mutual failed. We published it. Few people read it. The findings mattered; the study was unimpactful.

It also carried a limitation we could not resolve. Attorney performance is not measured in any way that supports a clean comparison, so the most plausible alternative explanation — that differences in attainment reflect differences in performance — stayed open.

Sports closes that door. Performance is measured objectively, at fine grain, and comparably across individuals, which is what makes the alternative explanation testable rather than merely arguable. And people pay attention to sports, which is what makes the answer travel.

That combination is what let us join a reform effort rather than only describe one. When findings are legible to the people setting policy, researchers can supply analyses on request, test proposals against data, and answer the question of where an intervention would actually bind. Most organizations facing representation gaps run the same debate — is the policy working, why not, what else — and try to settle it with aggregate headline numbers. Those numbers are where the debate starts. The question is which mechanisms, in which cells of the grid, produce the gap.

9%
NFL Head Coaches who are Black men, 2026 — 3 of 32
2%
Fortune 500 CEOs who are Black men, 2026 — 10 of 500
28
Black Fortune 500 CEOs in the list's entire history, out of 2,000+

Scale the lens beyond the NFL and the picture looks similar or worse — and by and large the mechanisms are the same.

Equity Analytics is the name for this way of working: document the disparity, elaborate the data-generating mechanisms, structure the comparisons that separate them, evaluate interventions against the decomposition. The NFL is a clean test bed. The framework applies anywhere careers progress through a hierarchy — consulting firms, academic medicine, law partnerships, venture capital, senior civil service, elected office.

Watch

Equity Analytics and the NFL's Rooney Rule

MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference

More on the framework and how it is being applied in other settings →

What's next

Two ways to take this further.

An open invitation

Run the trial.

Whether a Rooney Rule works is an empirical question that no organization has yet answered experimentally. One employer that hires at scale, willing to apply the rule to some openings and not others, would settle it within a year.

I will do the analysis pro bono.

Start a conversation →
The framework

Equity Analytics.

The NFL is one test bed. The same decomposition — document the disparity, elaborate the mechanisms, structure the comparisons, evaluate interventions — applies anywhere careers progress through a hierarchy.

Explore the framework →